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Reviewed by Julia Lamber
The relative rights of women and the fetuses they carry is one of the most
contentious issues of our time. The adequacy of traditional notions of equal-
ity-that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike-is also hotly
contested. Advances in prenatal diagnosis and prospects of a wide variety of
direct surgical interventions tilt the scales toward recognizing the developing
fetus as a person. While technologies are making us more aware of the
"unborn," they do so "at the cost of making transparent the mother."' As we
reevaluate maternal responsibility for fetal health, we talk about the mother as
"host," diminishing her independence, her desires, and her choices. These
maternal-fetal conflicts are part of a larger picture in which we too readily see
women as bad, unwilling, or irrelevant mothers, and in which we debate the
virtues (and possibilities) of the ideal mother.
Two recent books by political scientists extend the discussion of the conse-
quences of the fetal rights movement and its attendant maternal-fetal conflict.
In Fetal Protection in the Workplace: Women's Rights, Business Interests, and the
Unborn, Robert Blank, of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, provides
an extensive analysis of fetal protection plans in the workplace and the
scientific evidence that supports them; he argues for better ways of maximiz-
ing fetal health and women's employment choices and minimizing reproduc-
tive risks. In At Womens Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights,
Cynthia Daniels, of Rutgers University, examines the new politics of fetal
rights and women's relationship to the state through three cases studies of
maternal-fetal conflict. Both books take multidisciplinary approaches to an
important and complicated topic raised by everyday life. While neither offers a
profound or new theoretical lens through which to view it, both books are
interesting additions to the literature on maternal-fetal conflict.2
Julia Lamber is Professor of Law at Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of
Motherhood 114 (NewYork, 1986).
2. Classics include Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1219 (1986); Hannah Arterian Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to FetallyToxic Work
Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (1980); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to
Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity
Goals Under Title VII, 69 Geo. L.J. 641 (1981). See also Double Exposure: Women's Health
Hazards on the Job and at Home, ed. Wendy Chavkin (New York, 1984); Note, Maternal
Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 994 (1988).
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At Women's Expense
In At Women's Expense Daniels uses three case studies of maternal-fetal
conflict to illustrate three dimensions of political power: self-sovereignty,
political agency, and moral discourse. Forced medical treatment of pregnant
women illustrates self-sovereignty, defined by Daniels as "the simple right to
bodily integrity." According to Daniels, "the question raised by fetal rights
cases is whether the condition of pregnancy (or potential pregnancy) consti-
tutes a legitimate basis for limiting women's right to self-sovereignty" either
because women lack capacity for self-governance or because their rights
threaten the well-being of another. Employers' attempts to exclude women
from work on the basis of their fertility illustrate political agency, defined as
"the ability to transform public structures (in work and politics) to reflect
one's needs, interests, and concerns" (page 5). According to Daniels, "[f] etal
rights cases suggest that public structures of power must be 'degendered'
from the social, historical, and biological standpoint of women." Criminal
prosecutions of drug-addicted or alcohol-abusing pregnant women illustrate
moral discourse, defined as "the ability to legitimate the shared moral norms
and cultural beliefs which undergird power relations." The state's use of the
criminal law determines "where we assign culpability or blame for a problem
and how we define appropriate solutions" (6).
Daniels' discussion of forced medical treatment revolves around the cel-
ebrated case of In re A. C.3 A.C. was a pregnant twenty-eight-year-old married
woman with terminal cancer. She agreed in advance to a caesarean delivery at
twenty-eight weeks of gestation, knowing the chances of her child's survival
were much greater at that point. Unfortunately, she was near death when she
was twenty-five weeks pregnant. The hospital obtained a court order allowing
doctors to perform a caesarean delivery at twenty-six weeks. The child died
within three hours of delivery; the mother died two days later.
For Daniels, indeed for most of us, forced medical treatment is the clearest
case of maternal-fetal conflict. The fetus benefits from some intrusion on the
mother's body; there is no corresponding benefit for the mother. Many of us
hold a picture of the ideal mother who would naturally consent to surgery or
other medical procedures, subordinating her interests (and possibly her life)
to her soon-to-be-born child. But even if the mother has a good reason to
refuse the medical treatment, a conflict between the mother and her fetus
exists. According to Daniels, this "conflict between woman and fetus was not
inherent in the technology, but was created by a social climate which increas-
ingly came to see women as reluctant mothers, unwilling to sacrifice them-
selves, to subordinate their careers, or to suffer medical risks in the interests of
their (born and unborn) children" (41).
Daniels describes three primary narratives that influence the debate over
forced medical treatment of pregnant women (42). First, narratives character-
ize women who refuse treatment as bad, negligent, or unwilling mothers who
use the medical issue as a way out of an unwanted or unplanned pregnancy.
3. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
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Second, narratives portray women who refuse medical treatment as irrational
or ignorant, or as religious zealots unduly suspicious or fearful of modem
medical technology. In contrast to the previous two narratives, the third sort
of narrative depicts the pregnant women who refuse medical treatment as
rational in certain circumstances. These narratives are important because they
provide the reason to resolve the maternal-fetal conflict one way rather than
another. If a woman is irrational or ignorant, or otherwise lacks the capacity
for self-governance, there is legitimate reason for someone else not only to
resolve the conflict but also to advance another set of interests.
Portraying the issue of forced medical treatment as an explicit conflict
between mother and fetus forces a choice between the attractive claims of
mother and fetus. Daniels concludes that women's right to bodily integrity has
been upheld only "when the woman's commitment to motherhood is unques-
tioned," when she is "able to align herself with powerful male organizations,"
and when she is able to cast the threat to bodily integrity as a problem of all
patients, not just women (52). Daniels applauds the ultimate outcome of
court decisions such as In re A. C., which held that "in virtually all cases the
question of what is to be done is to be decided by the patient-the pregnant
woman-on behalf of herself and the fetus." 4 But she cautions that these
successes are biased in terms of class and race: health care providers continue
to pressure women into accepting medical treatment if their commitment to
motherhood is suspect, if they are unable or unwilling to align themselves with
the medical establishment, or if they are deemed to be irrational or ignorant.
Daniels uses the recent Supreme Court decision in International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.5 as the context in which to examine employer
attempts to exclude women from work on the basis of their fertility. Under
these policies, employers exclude women from jobs that involve exposure to
substances known or suspected to cause harm to fetuses. Johnson Controls
excluded all women (except those whose inability to bear children was medi-
cally documented) from the jobs in its battery manufacturing division where
lead levels were excessive. In 1991 the Supreme Court struck down the
company's so-called fetal protection program as a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to the Court: "The bias in Johnson
Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a
choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular
job."6 Because the employer could not offer an acceptablejustification for this
difference in treatment, the policy was impermissible under the statute.
In this discussion the pregnant worker "symbolizes the antithesis between
(female) reproduction and the (male) workplace: women's ability to give
birth [is] used ... to deny women full access to paid labor and economic
independence" (58). Most workplace rules, norms, and physical structures
assume a male worker. Daniels argues that "[t] he challenge of gender equality
4. Id. at 1237.
5. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
6. Id. at 197.
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is not simply integrating women into masculine structures of power, but
placing what has historically (and biologically) been defined as distinctive
about women at the heart of social structures and public debate in politics and
work" (59). As Daniels points out, a risk of "going public" with women's
reproductive concerns is that it reinforces "essentialist assumptions about
women's connection to motherhood, which entail treating them as if they
were always pregnant" (59). Fetal protection policies are another such
risk. Employers use a concern for the health of the pregnant woman and
the fetus she carries as a reason to exclude her and all fertile women from
the workplace.
The point of Daniels' discussion is to expose the gendered nature of the
policies, the science, and the public discussions. "Why did fetal protection
policies emerge when they did... ?" Daniels asks (63). Before 1964,Johnson
Controls employed no women in its battery production facility. Under pres-
sure from federal statutes and other governmental policies, Johnson Controls
began hiring women in the 1970s. In the late 1970s the company instituted a
voluntary policy, encouraging women not to take these jobs if they were
planning to become pregnant or to transfer from the jobs if they became
pregnant. The policy became mandatory in 1982. Daniels notes the familiarity
of this pattern in male-dominated industries; she contrasts this workplace
history with the lack of fetal protection policies in traditionally female occupa-
tions or poor-paying jobs (85).
Casting fetal protection policies specifically in terms of the maternal-fetal
conflict, Daniels explores the effects of two assumptions that question women's
ability to make their own choices about reproductive health and fetal risks.
The first assumption is that women are not capable of controlling reproduc-
tion; unplanned pregnancies introduce unpredictability and disruption into
the workplace, and fertile women must be eliminated because they cannot be
controlled or managed. The second is that women may be unwilling to
subordinate their economic interests to the health interests of their unborn
children; employers, then, must act as surrogates for the public interest when
a mother neglects the interest of her fetus (69).
Interspersed with Daniels' discussion of women's rationality and their
ability to make responsible choices about fetal health is the science question.
The United Auto Workers, challenging the fetal protection policy, argued
that the link between science and politics is made clear by standards of
scientific proof that are deeply biased to favor recognition of some kinds of
health effects (direct fetal harm) over others (reproductive harm generally to
men and women) (77). The key forJohnson Controls was the science-based
denial that the fetus can be harmed through its father's exposure to lead
before conception (66). For the challenger, it was important to convince the
Court that the employer had overstated the harm through maternal exposure
and had understated the risk to men and the risks to fetal health through
paternal exposure (76).
Daniels labels the Johnson Controls decision a feminist victory (90). She
concludes that the Court not only refused to affirm fetal protection policies
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but also refused to affirm traditional assumptions about women, motherhood,
and work: "The decision challenges the traditional dichotomy between family
and work concerns, and addresses the ways in which work and motherhood
actually intersect and conflict for women" (91). In this way the case also
reaffirms Daniels' notion of political agency, transforming work structures to
reflect women's needs, interests, and concerns.
The last case study involves criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted or
alcohol-abusing pregnant women. Daniels describes prosecutions for furnish-
ing drugs to a minor (through the umbilical cord), possession of illegal
substances (based on evidence from the newborn's blood), child abuse or
neglect, child endangerment, and even homicide. Although most prosecu-
tions are unsuccessful, legislatures continue to consider new laws criminalizing
the particular behavior (e.g., endangering a fetus) or adding such behavior to
the list of factors to be considered at sentencing. What is important here is
using the moral force of the criminal law to define acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior rather than simply formulating general statements of good
social policy.
While using the criminal law in this way is the least successful of the fetal
protection policies, it is perhaps the most understandable. Daniels says that
the "birth of an addicted baby violates what we think of as an imperative of
human society-that we care for and nurture, if not ourselves, then at least
our children" (98). In previous chapters, she argues that women are rational
enough to make their own choices about fetal risks and that women (not
fathers, employers, or doctors) are in the best position to defend fetal inter-
ests. But those very claims are problematic in prenatal substance abuse cases.
Abusing dangerous drugs is not rational behavior at any time, and a pregnant
woman's substance abuse puts her in clear conflict with her fetus.
Daniels argues that continued prosecutions (even if unsuccessful) of drug-
addicted or alcohol-abusing pregnant women are built on notions of crisis,
transgression, and retribution (106). Proponents of prosecutions argue that
there is an epidemic of drug use by pregnant women calling for dramatic
action; that the crisis represents a transgression of fundamental maternal
instincts; and that this transgression has demanded retribution rather than
rehabilitation: "Pregnant addicts represented not the lost, confused, or mis-
guided mother, but the anti-mother" (106).
Daniels then describes the critique of the myth of the pregnant addict and
the argument against criminal prosecutions. The critics claim that the num-
ber of women abusing drugs has been drastically inflated. They question the
representation of the drug-addicted pregnant woman as the anti-mother and
argue thatwomen who are addicted can still be caring and loving parents. And
they question whether only women are responsible for the health of their
children and whether they alone should bear the criminal costs (123). Accord-
ing to this view, it is important to see these prosecutions as illustrating
faulty moral discourse. By using the criminal law to define acceptable and
unacceptable behavior, we assign culpability to the mother, and we limit
appropriate solutions.
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At Women's Expense takes on an important issue and examines it with both
customary and unusual examples. Daniels writes with a sense of urgency and
caring. She displays breadth of knowledge in vastly different spheres, public
and private-criminal law, medical treatment, the workplace. Unfortunately,
she is sometimes careless about important details. For example, in telling the
story of A.C., Daniels never suggests any reason for the hospital to intervene,
and the reader gets the impression that this kind of interference is common-
place. Omitted from her retelling is the evidence that there were contradic-
tory indications of what A.C. herself wanted. Daniels also conveys little sense
that A. C. is a famous case, much discussed in the literature; it is one of few
appellate decisions on the subject of forced medical treatment of pregnant
women. Daniels neglects to provide us with the conventional analytical frame-
work in such cases or an alternative view which posits that the mother's and
the fetus's interests are the same-the best chance for the child once born to
survive-and differ only in the details.
In the chapter on fetal protection policies, Daniels is careless in her
discussion of the Johnson Controls case. She discusses the scientific evidence
introduced and refers to oral testimony in the Supreme Court. One of the
most important aspects of Johnson Controls is that the case never went to trial:
there was no "evidence" and no "testimony," and certainly no testimony
before the Supreme Court.
In the chapter on criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant women,
Daniels reverts to overstatement in trying to redirect empathy. "Most pregnant
addicted women are also victims of violence and abuse," she tells us, and most
"have little or no access to health care or prenatal care" (129). Empirical
support for either proposition is lacking; even if true, the propositions do not
help resolve the maternal-fetal conflict raised by drug addiction. Moreover,
the number of drug-addicted babies she cites is high. While the behavior of
these addicted women may be inconsistent with our image of "the good
mother," admitting this is not the same as agreeing that we ought to use the
criminal law to condemn their behavior.
Fetal Protection in the Workplace
In Fetal Protection in the Workplace, Robert Blank focuses more specifically on
employer policies that exclude women from work on the basis of their fertility.
Challenging the necessity of casting this workplace issue as a maternal-fetal
conflict, Blank argues that the focus on fetal hazards has diverted attention
from the broader issue of both men's and women's reproductive health in the
workplace. He also asserts that fetal protection policies have dominated public
and legal debate so as to obscure the need for alternative public policies, such
as prenatal care or pregnancy leaves. One purpose of his book is to redirect
the policy focus toward "more meaningful strategies for meeting the twin
goals of protecting women's rights and the interests of unborn children" (26).
Blank's first two chapters present a brief history of sex discrimination in the
workplace and the scientific evidence of workplace hazards to reproductive
health and harm to the developing fetus. He tells a familiar story in both
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chapters. In his survey of sex discrimination litigation he contrasts modem
fetal protection policies with the so-called protective legislation for women
that was the subject of litigation at the beginning of the twentieth century-
state statutes limiting the number of hours women could work, the number of
days in a row they could work, how much weight they could lift, and thejobs
they could perform. Blank then summarizes the constitutional framework for
determining if this governmental action was impermissible sex discrimination
(classifications based on sex must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest). 7 Finally he describes the analytical framework of both
Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. It is within this
context of the hard-fought efforts to expand women's rights in the workplace
over the last half-century that he examines the "new manifestations of protec-
tionism" implicit in fetal protection policies (42).
Blank's survey of the evidence of reproductive hazards in the workplace
recounts the broad range of potential hazards, the problems in identifying
teratogenic agents in humans, and the difficulty of ascertaining susceptibility
of males and females. For fetal protection policies he sees two issues: establish-
ing a causal connection between certain workplace toxins at particular levels
and harm to developing fetuses, and determining whether fetuses are at risk
through exposed male workers. Blank thinks more research needs to be done
on the fetal damage that may be caused by male exposure to teratogens, but
the fact that the woman carries the fetus means "the more direct impact is on
the mother" (58). Blank agrees with employers who argue that "the critical
period of development occurs between the third and twelfth weeks of human
gestation" (79); fetal protection policies, if they are to work, must include
some women who are not aware that they are pregnant.
According to Blank, concerns for fetal health in the workplace "arise out of
a heightened understanding of fetal development and evidence on the poten-
tial deleterious effects of the working environment" (42). He turns then to
recent fetal protection policies, analyzing their rationales, the criticisms of
such policies, and the responses of courts and regulatory agencies. Employers
havejustified fetal protection policies on two grounds. First, employers argue
that "they have a societal and moral obligation to protect future generations
from damage imposed through a pregnant woman's exposure to toxicants in
the workplace" (87). Second, they are concerned "over the economic costs of
possible liability suits from children who are exposed to toxicants through
their mother during gestation" (93).
Critics of such policies attack thejustifications directly. They argue that the
employers' fear of liability is greatly exaggerated, given that no child has
recovered a money judgment from an employer because of a parent's expo-
sure to workplace toxins (95). Critics point out that employers have been
inconsistent in setting risk levels for exclusion-eager t6 exclude women from
exposure to potentially hazardous substances, but hostile to more general
claims of workplace safety for all workers (96). Critics argue that fetal protec-
7. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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tion policies are overinclusive because not all fertile women are going to
become (or stay) pregnant and underinclusive because they assume that
exposure of only the fertile female employee puts the fetus at risk (97).
Blank then looks atjudicial challenges to fetal protection policies. Before
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, the outcome of judicial
decisions turned on which Title VII analytical framework a court used. If the
court saw the fetal protection policies as treating women differently from men
in a situation where men and women were similarly situated, the court held
that the employer's policy could be justified only by Title Vil's statutory
defense, the "bona fide occupational qualification." This defense requires the
employer to show that the excluded class is unable to perform the duties
constituting the "essence" of the job (107). In contrast, if the court saw the
fetal protection policies as reasonable, the court would allow the employer to
attempt tojustify the fetal protection policies as a "business necessity" (104--
05) .8 The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controlswas important not only
because it was unanimous in striking down the employer's fetal protection
policy but also because it eliminated the analytical confusion that had led to
inconsistent decisions by lower courts.
For Blank, "[t]he ultimate impact. of Johnson Controls will depend on how
employers respond in the absence of fetal protection policies and how courts
deal with future workplace liability cases" (115). His final chapters address
these issues, examining the current system for compensating victims of
occupational injuries and alternative policies that are more likely to
maximize women's employment choices and minimize occupational hazards
to reproduction.
While most discussions of fetal protection policies conclude with questions
about the impact of Johnson Controls, Blank changes direction to evaluate the
two separate and largely exclusive systems for compensating victims of repro-
ductive injury or disease resulting from workplace hazards-worker's com-
pensation and civil torts (123). After analyzing typical state worker's compen-
sation laws, he concludes that reproductive harms are generally not compen-
sated because they fall to meet typical requirements in state schemes (124-
26). In contrast, after surveying major changes in the body of law surrounding
birth and pregnancy, Blank concludes that a consensus now exists that a child,
once born, has the right to bring a common law tort action for injuries
suffered before birth (134-35). He notes that the logic that increasingly
allows causes of action against third parties for prenatal injuries or fetal death
is bound to extend to cases for parental negligence, particularly where a
parent knowingly chooses to act in a way that places the unborn child at risk
(151-52).
Blank's concluding chapter offers recommendations for revamping the
compensation system to better protect the reproductive health of all workers,
especially pregnant women and their unborn children, and to reduce the
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i). Typically this defense is reserved for claims in which a
facialy neutral employment rule has an adverse effect on women that the employer attempts
tojustify.
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possibility of tort action against parents for the employment choices they
make. He begins with the proposition that "women must have the opportunity
to carry out their pregnancies free from occupational hazards wherever pos-
sible" (154). Unfortunately, Blank has no new ideas for making this a reality.
He proposes that employers clean up the workplace, educate and give full
disclosure to employees about the risks, provide temporary job transfers
without loss of wage or seniority, allow paid maternity leave with full benefits
and no loss of seniority, and guarantee prenatal health care availability. These
are all good ideas that are standard recommendations in the literature, but he
does not tell how to implement such reforms. Nor does he estimate the costs
of his reforms or compare the costs to the possible benefits. Without such
analysis, employers are unlikely to volunteer these additional employment
benefits; the government seems unlikely to require them.
While not advancing any new reforms, Blank does remind us that fetal
protection policies failed because they created a false dichotomy and forced
opponents into an untenable dilemma. The choices about reproductive health
were limited to two possibilities: either "women's reproductive health should
be protected from workplace hazards by exclusion" or "women's reproductive
health should not be protected from workplace hazards" (179). Blank's in-
sight is an important one, especially when we think about ways to maximize
women's employment choices and minimize reproductive risks.
The Dilemma Continues
The trouble with both books is that they do not offer a new way of thinking
about an old problem. Mary Becker, Hannah Furnish, and Wendy Williams
have said this all before.9 Pregnancy has always posed an analytical puzzle. In
early cases about the availability of disability benefits for pregnancy, women
challenged the exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise inclusive benefits
plan. The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion, reasoning thiat men and
women were treated the same: there were no risks from which men were
protected and women were not, and none from which women were protected
and men were not.'0 The difference in treatment was between pregnant and
nonpregnant people. 1 The former group was all female, but the latter group
was both male and female. Thus, by treating women and men the same, we
risk ignoring the issue of pregnancy altogether.
As a reaction to these early pregnancy cases, Congress amended Title VII by
adding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which made clear that pregnancy
was not a non-event: rather, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was
discrimination on the basis of gender and thus impermissible under Title VII.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act continued the equal treatment model by
providing that women affected by pregnancy should be treated, for all
employment-related purposes, the same as others not so affected but similar
9. See supra note 2.
10. Geduldigv.Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (constitutional challenge); General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (Tide VII challenge).
11. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135.
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in their ability or inability to work. The problem with this model is that what
happens to pregnant women is determined by what happens to men. As the
narratives in both Daniels' and Blank's books aptly show, issues arise for or
about pregnant women that simply do not arise for or about men or nonpreg-
nant women.
If we respond to this dilemma by treating pregnancy separately or in a
special way, we risk essentializing women, supporting the view that women are
inevitably and inescapably mothers. As Blank's history confirms, we have an
uncomfortable history of using women's childbearing capacity to justify their
separate treatment. We now know that legislation of this sort "protected"
women out ofjobs by making them less attractive as employees."2 If we have
not settled on a principled way to think about pregnancy, it should come as no
surprise that, when the rights of women and the fetuses they carry conflict, we
do not have a principled way of settling the conflict.
It is curious that we are so eager to recognize fetal harms and to see the
issue in terms of direct maternal-fetal conflict that needs to be resolved one
way for all times. For all the controversy and high emotions surrounding
efforts toward fetal protection, the rights of women and the fetuses they carry
are, for the most part, invisible. For all the furor over fetal protection policies,
many women affected by exposure to toxicants in the workplace are not
covered by these policies. Women are excluded only when they are viewed as
marginal workers in industries where men traditionally hold the positions. For
example, despite known reproductive hazards in the clothing/textile indus-
try, in laundry/dry cleaning establishments, for migrant workers, and for
hospital workers, fetal protection policies are uncommon in these areas.
Similarly, evidence suggests that the best protection of fetal health is
prenatal care and attention to the general health of the mother. Practical
issues of fetal welfare arise when the mother cannot get enough to eat, has no
warm place to stay, or is not physically safe. But solutions to those problems
are not easy or inexpensive. What's interesting is the ease with which policy-
makers identify problems as compelling moral crises in need of immediate
resolution whenever they can be solved by limiting the freedom of women.
12. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the Employment
of Women in 1920, 88J. Pol. Econ. 476 (1980).
David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994. Pp. xviii + 426.
Reviewed by Kenneth F. Ledford
When the members of the Parliamentary Council met in Bonn in 1948 and
1949, they were intensely aware of the problematic nature of their project of
providing a framework for the return of self-government to at least some
Germans. Recognizing the enormity of the challenges that faced them and
their countrymen, including guilt for war and Holocaust, military occupation,
economic prostration, and division by the hardening ideological line of the
Iron Curtain, they modestly called the document that they produced a Basic
Law (Grundgesetz), postponing until some unforeseen later time the more
permanent task of writing a constitution (Verfassung).
Yet in a land of dubious constitutional heritage, the Basic Law prospered
along with the Economic Miracle between 1949 and 1989. The May 1989
anniversary of its entry into effect evoked a wave of celebratory conferences,
essays, and books lauding its maturation into the first functioning system of
democracy and individual rights in German history. And the dramatic events
of November 1989 to October 1990, culminating in the previously unimagin-
able unification of Germany, cemented its permanence and converted the
Basic Law legally, if not in name, into the permanent and living constitution
that could only be dimly imagined in 1949.
Now one of the leading scholars of the Constitution of the United States
has expanded his focus to provide an extraordinarily comprehensive and
useful treatise on what he can rightly call the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Not only is David P. Currie's book now the quickest
introduction for an American-trained lawyer to the constitutional structure,
doctrine, andjurisprudence of the Federal Republic, but together with Donald
P. Kommers's The ConstitutionalJurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany,'
it should remain the standard work for years to come.
Currie organizes his book in a manner familiar to students in American
constitutional law courses. He addresses the specific constitutional provisions
and judicial interpretations by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) of five particular aspects of German law: the structure of the
federal system created by the Basic Law; the doctrine of the separation of
powers; freedom of expression, including that of political parties, state offi-
cials, the media, and the universities; the relationship between church and
Kenneth F. Ledford is Assistant Professor of History and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law at
Case Western Reserve University.
1. Durham, 1989.
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 46, Number 2 (June 1996)
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state; and a miscellaneous array of fundamental rights including marriage,
family, property, occupational freedom, life, liberty (dignity), personality, and
equality. Although his text deals almost exclusively with the development of
doctrine in Germany, his copious footnotes provide comparison, contrast,
and analogy to American doctrine and practice, which proves very helpful to
orient those unfamiliar with the German system.
In particular, Currie helps to illuminate three aspects of German constitu-
tional doctrine that prove puzzling to many Americans. First, he explores the
nature of federalism as conceived by the Germans. On the surface, federalism
in Germany and the United States looks the same, operating as a presumption
that in the absence of a specific delegation of power to the central govern-
ment, sovereign authority remains with the constituent states. But this discus-
sion has the potential to lead to manifold misunderstandings, for in practice
the terminology of federalism often means the reverse for Germans of what it
means for Americans. In the United States, the "federal government" means
the central, national government "inside the Beltway" in Washington; in
Germany, the phrase means the government of the particular constituent
state (Bundesland) in question. Thus, the initial impression is that the Germans
take federalism far more seriously than do the post-New Deal Americans,
reserving far greater powers to the states.
As Currie points out, what has emerged in Germany is a thickly imbricated
tapestry of exclusive national, exclusive state, concurrent, and delegatedjuris-
dictions. The Basic Law explicitly divides certain powers to legislate, but it also
delegates execution of national laws to the states and permits the central
government to delegate other duties through "framework legislation"
(Rahmengesetz) that provides latitude to state parliaments to exercise local
discretion. Quite obviously, this complexity has led to a lively constitutional
jurisprudence to define limits and test particulars, and Currie explains it ably.
Second, Currie steps bravely into the thicket of the legal limitation upon
legislative discretion that is provided by the "principle of proportionality"
(Verhdltnismdfiigkeitsprinzip). Rooted in eighteenth-century Prussian legal
thought about the state ruled by law (Rechtsstaat), this principle operates as d
substantive limit on the parliament's right to legislate in a realm expressly
placed within its jurisdiction by the Basic Law. Even specifically authorized
restrictions on freedom must be reasonable, proportionate to the ends sought
(page 20). Analogous to substantive due process in the United States, the
proportionality principle has proved in the hands of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court a powerful check upon the unbridled sovereignty of a legislature
in a parliamentary system.
Third, Currie explores in ample detail the many ways in which German
constitutional practice converts a negative prohibition on governmental inter-
ference with a citizen's right into an affirmative obligation of the state to
promote that right. In ways that again evoke images of substantive due pro-
cess, German constitutionalism crosses what David Abraham has called the
Isaiah Berlin Wall from negative to positive liberty. Part of this practice is
based upon the Basic Law's declaration that the Federal Republic is not only a
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state of formal liberty, a Rechtsstaat (Article 20, Paragraph 3), but also one of
substantive liberty, a social state or Sozialstaat (Article 20, Paragraph 1). Part is
rooted in the fundamental right of the inviolability of human dignity (Article
1, Paragraph 1). And yet another part is grounded upon the guarantee of
equality before the law (Article 3, Paragraph 1). Regardless of source, in case
after case the Federal Constitutional Court has invalidated legislative action
because it infringes upon untouchable but implicit freedoms of the citizen
and has required positive legislative steps and support to enable citizens
meaningfully to exercise liberties guaranteed to them in the Basic Law.
Currie's helpful and systematic explication of German constitutional law
comes despite three weaknesses that crop up periodically. First, and most
serious from the point of view of a historian of Germany, Currie's tendency to
rely solely upon treatises on constitutional law and history produced by legal
scholars deprives him of the insight of newer generations of social and
political historians of Germany. The teaching and scholarship of law is far
more historically oriented in Germany than in the United States, but scholars
in law faculties tend to remain isolated from the work of their colleagues in
history departments in the philosophical faculties. It is true that for years
"pure" historians underestimated the centrality of law, constitutional and
other, to an understanding of political and social conflicts and continuities,
but much recent work has helped to rectify this neglect, and Currie does not
consider it.
His exclusive and ahistorical focus upon legal scholarship leads Currie into
his second error, his uncritical reliance on standard legal treatises. While he
takes into account the work of Dieter Grimm and other progressive judge/
scholars, Currie should have considered the checkered background of much
postwar legal scholarship in Germany. The first generation of scholars after
1949 were men who had been deeply involved in the judicial system during
the National Socialist era. Many were de-Nazified, especially in the American
zone, in the first years after the war, but after 1949 they again made their way
back into positions of power and influence in the judiciary and legal faculties.
Constitutional commentators such as Theodor Maunz and historians such as
Ernst Rutolf Huber are known to have harbored strongly right-wing and
authoritarian views, and their scholarship must be consciously and explicitly
interpreted through the lens of that knowledge, a lens that Currie does not
bring to bear.2
Finally, the third shortcoming of Currie's book is his irritating habit of
periodically injecting into the text his own ideological disagreements with
American constitutional jurisprudence. Currie does not like federal funding
of higher education and prefers private universities to public (236-37); he
believes that Supreme Court decisions in the United States relegate property
2. For Maunz and Huber in particular, both students of Carl Schmitt, see Ingo Miller, Hitler's
Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider, 42, 241 (Maunz),
42, 82-83 (Huber) (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). After his death in 1993, it came to light that
Maunz had actively supported right-wing extremist groups from the early 1970s until his
death. See Michael Stolleis,Juristen: Ein biographisches Lexikon 416 (Munich, 1995).
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rights to an "inferior position" compared to other rights (290); he mourns the
passing of economic due process cases in the post-Lochner era (302); and he
believes that the Supreme Court has "given up" on federalism and the separa-
tion of powers (339). All of these are interesting and debatable positions in
U.S. constitutional law and well argued in Currie's two respected volumes on
that history, but they are strikingly out of place in a work on German constitu-
tional jurisprudence.
Yet these criticisms pale in comparison to the magnitude of Currie's achieve-
ment. His book provides American legal scholars with an important vehicle to
enter into a fruitful comparative dialogwith German constitutionalism (with a
helpful translation of the Basic Law that has all amendments up to December
1, 1993, thus including the unification amendments and the May 1993 amend-
ment to the right of asylum). Perhaps more important, it also helps non-
Germans have faith thatJfirgen Habermas's much-cited call for a "constitu-
tional patriotism" as the proper modulation of a newly assertive German
national identity has a suitable constitution in which to anchor itself.
